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ABSTRACT 
Three main hypotheses are proposed to explain the male marriage premium. They are 
marriage selection hypothesis, male-female labor specialization hypothesis and simply 
discrimination. This paper tries to test if marriage selection hypothesis explains the male 
marriage premium. The effect of marriage selection, which means males with higher 
productivity have higher possibility to be chosen into marriage, should be positively 
correlated to the marriage market competition level in the area and thus in area with 
higher marriage market competition, a higher density of high productivity males should 
be observed among married males. On the other hand, the labor specialization is a post-
marriage process and should have no relationship with marriage market competition. This 
difference can be tested to achieve the main purpose of the paper. After analyze the 2005-
2012 ACS data, we find a positive correlation between marriage market competition and 
density of high productivity males. Marriage selection hypothesis explains the marriage 
premium. 
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
It has been long noticed that a wage gap exists between married and unmarried males. This male
marriage premium exists in a lot of empirical works using different datasets, and this phenomenon
raises wide interests.
Hill's research (1979) finds that married men have higher wages than males with any other
marriage status, using data from the 1976 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The marriage premium
is between 26% to 31% for white man and 22% to 27% for black man. Also, she reports that married
males spend more time on job training than unmarried males. Bartlett and Callahan (1984), find
that married males earn about 25% higher wage than unmarried males, after analyzing data from
National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men. In the work of Schoeni (1990), the marriage premiums
are estimated in 12 different countries and the estimated marriage premiums are from 3% to 32%.
The common characteristic of these researches is that they all use a wage determination model with
a set of variables representing productivity and a marriage status dummy. The coefficient of the
dummy estimates the marriage premium.
Three main hypotheses are established to explain male marriage premium: marriage selection
hypothesis, family labor specialization hypothesis and discrimination hypothesis.
In the marriage selection hypothesis, we assume a selection exists when females choose their
spouses and thus only productive males with higher wage get married, leaving those unproductive
and low-income males single. This hypothesis also implies that some attributes that have positive
effects in marriage market are positive in labor market as well. For example, some abilities like
social communication ability and the degree of cooperating are helpful for a man to find a spouse
in marriage market, and are also helpful to get a higher salary in labor market. Under marriage
selection hypothesis, marriage has no causal effect on wage, but inverse, productivity or wage has
causal effect on marriage. That means the ability of a man is highly correlated with marriage status,
and correlated with income wage as well.
On the other hand, the male-female labor specialization hypothesis assumes marriage is the
causal effect of being more productive and having higher income wage. The hypothesis behind is
well known as Becker's (1975) Theory of Family. The theory postulates that labor specialization
occurs between husband and wife in a marriage, and thus the married male has less opportunity
cost to invest in human capital than those who are single.
Sanders Korenman and David Neumark (1991) have done an extraordinary work on empirical
test for the marriage selection hypothesis. Noticing in labor specialization hypothesis, the wage
increase is caused by human capital accumulation, which is a time consuming process. And in
marriage selection hypothesis, atrributes that make males competitive in marriage market as well as
labor market have high possibility to be time fixed. The unobservable time fixed attribute is added
to the model and by subtracting the average value of each variable over time, the time fixed variable
is canceled out, and the model is successfully estimated. Using a time fixed attribution model,
Korenman and Neumark reduce the marriage status coefficient by nearly 50%. The significant
reduction is consistent with the hypothesis.
The main drawback of Sanders Korenman and David Neumark's method is the need for further
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discussion of the time invariance of these unobservable characteristics. Also, the model cannot
control for employer's favor of married males, or, the discrimination.
Christopher Dougherty (2006) argued that the behaviors of young people are noticeably different
from those of mature adults and thus those unobservable characteristics are not time fixed. An
alternative model is established and estimated to capture this maturity process. The model uses
a set of dummy variables to indicate the number of years before or after the marriage. The result
of his research shows that, the premium is attributable to an unobserved time distributed effect
that emerges and grows with the approach of marriage and continues to grow for some years after
marriage. This model is very clever and applicable. The model is easy to estimate and the result
from this model is highly consistent with intuitive deductions.
A more detailed effort is done by Eng Seng Loh (1996), in which the author tests the Becker's
(1975) theory of family. Becker's theory implies men will have a higher wage premium from his
nonworking wife than from a working wife. The result shows that, the size of wage premium
does not vary from wife's labor supply decision. Also, Loh compares the wage difference between
married self-employed male and unmarried self-employed male, so that the employers' discrimination
is eliminated. The result shows married self-employed male earns less than unmarried self-employed
male which implies no productivity difference among married and unmarried males. Another test
Loh conducts is comparing wage premium between males that cohabitate with their wives with
those do not. The result shows no premium variance among these two groups. Each of the results
violates Becker's family specialization and human capital accumulation theory. The source of this
marriage premium is not likely from productivity difference. This result is astonishing, because
under classical economic assumptions, employers are rational and thus wage rate should only be
determined by marginal productivity. The model Loh uses does not fully control the productivity
and thus has biasness problem.
In an elaborated research conducted by Cornaglia and Feldman (2010), they use hand-collected
longitude data of baseball players to perform the test of those hypotheses. The advantage of us-
ing data of baseball players is that baseball industry has a long history of statistics collection and
numerous direct measurements of productivity. Also performance in baseball is directly quantifi-
able and with a number of measures that are relatively independent of the actions of the player's
teammates. In their result, no robust statistically significant effect on productivity is found and
even when controlling for the productivity directly in the earning equation, the marriage premium
remains positive and statistically significant with a value of 20%. Employers may discriminate in
favor of married players. However, the nature of this discrimination still needs investigation. They
also find evidence that the team's wining chance is positively correlated with married players' ratio.
Employers may discriminate in favor of married players because they lead to overall greater team
success that is not necessarily captured by the productivity measures. In this context, the marriage
premium should attribute to unobserved characteristics that married people tend to possess and are
highly valued in labor market as well as in marriage market.
As shown above, the key to find sources of marriage premium is to find the proper wage determi-
nation equation. Once the variables are well controlled, the source of marriage premium is obvious.
Two major difficulties exist on modeling this problem. First, productivity is not well defined and
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hard to measure. The usual way to model wage determination is using experience, education, train-
ing and several demographic characteristics to proxy for productivity. A more reliable method is to
limit the research to athletics, thus the productivity is well defined and monitored. However, as in
Cornaglia and Feldman's (2010), even in such a well-defined context, it is hard to specify the pro-
ductivity. Second, some characteristics that are important to wage determination are not observable
or measurable, thus elaborative work should be done to cover these variables in the model.
2 Methodology
Because of the difficulty in constructing an unbiased wage determination model, the researches
dedicated to quantitatively estimate how much a hypothesis does explain the marriage premium
should be thrown doubt upon. The inevitable biasness suffered by all models makes many of these
estimations biased, unless the method the research uses is biasness insensitive, or the research's goal
is to qualitatively test the hypotheses. In this article, we avoid using wage regression as the main
method and instead of testing the hypotheses quantitatively, we qualitatively test these hypotheses
using a method described below.
2.1 Method Description
We first made a hypothesis that both the marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis
are not true, which means not only women do not care about the productivity level of male when
choosing their spouses but also marriage does not make males more specialized or become more
productivity. For the conciseness, we call it Hypothesis I. Because marriage has no selection effect on
males' productivity, the marriage market will generate a population of married males just as a process
to generate a random subsample from the whole male population. These two samples should share
exactly same characteristics such as the same male productivity distribution. Because we also assume
marriage will not make males more specialized or more productive, no post-marriage effect will occur
to cause any shift in this distribution. Under Hypothesis I, the males' productivity distribution
should be same between the whole male population sample and the married male subsample. If this
is consistent with the data we have, we do not reject Hypothesis I, both hypotheses do not explain
the marriage premium; however if we observe different distribution of males' productivity between
the whole male population sample and the married male subsample, we reject the Hypothesis I and
should have further tests about the remaining three situations (hypotheses): first, both marriage
selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis are true; second, only selection hypothesis is true;
third, only specialization hypothesis is true.
Actually, as will be shown in the following part of this article, the data shows a higher density
of high productivity male in married population than in the whole population. Further tests are
needed. To conduct further tests, we should analyze how the distribution of males' productivity is
different from each other under each hypothesis. The analysis starts with finding the exact effects
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to cause this distribution difference.
Both two hypotheses predict a higher density of high productivity males in married population.
The marriage selection, which has the Marriage Selection Effect, will causes married population
to have a higher density of high productivity males, because higher productivity male has higher
possibility to get married due to the females' preference over higher productivity males. The labor
specialization, which has Labor Specialization Effect, causes males become more productive workers
after marriage because married males can be more specialized in their labor market jobs and have
less opportunity cost to accumulate their human capitals. This will also make married population
to have a higher density of high productivity males. However, the specialization happens only after
marriage. It is totally a post-marriage process, and marriage market behavior should have no effect
on it. On the other hand, the marriage selection is a marriage market behavior and in different
marriage market with different marriage market characteristics, different Marriage Selection Effect
should be observed. Consider the following Statement: the Marriage Selection Effect is one of the
consequences of marriage market competition; thus the level of competition is positively related to
the Marriage Selection Effect. This Statement can be used to test which Effect is the reason of the
male's productivity distribution difference.
First, one thing should be clarified here is that, by saying males' productivity distribution, we
mean the distributions as shown in Figure 11. The horizontal axis is the productivity level, and
the vertical axis is the percentage in the population (density). For the demonstration convenience,
we suppose our male population is divided into four groups by their productivity level. In Figure
1, the red line represents productivity distribution in total population, and the blue line represents
the productivity distribution in married population. We would like to call the red line Neutral
Distribution (ND) and the blue line Observed distribution (OD). By using the word neutral
we hope to denote a distribution under no marriage selection or labor specialization effect; and by
using the word observed we hope to denote the observed distribution in the real world, under
the effect of marriage selection and labor specialization. The effect of marriage selection or labor
specialization can be represented by the degree of shifting from ND to OD. In Figure 1(a), the
ND and OD overlapping with each other which means the population is not under the Marriage
Selection or Labor Specialization Effect (the Effect for conciseness). In Figure 1(b), the OD differs
from the ND, with a higher percentage population on the right ends. This shows existence of the
Effect. Figure 1(c) which has the same ND as (b) exhibits a similar pattern but has different degree
of shifting. This means a different level of Effects exist in the population. In Figure 1(d), both ND
and OD are different from those in (b). Thus, different Marriage Selection or Labor Specialization
Effect can be shown in different sets of these kinds of figures. However using such figures makes it
difficult to tell the level of the Effects. The level of the Effects is not only decided by the shape of
OD, but also influenced by the shape of ND. That means the same Selection or Specialization Effect
will produce different sets of figures due to the different population structure. Also, the degree of
shifting is hard to properly measure.
Because of the difficulties mentioned above, we would like to have another tool to represent the
1Figure 1 is made up for the convenience of illustration and is not based on any existing data.
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Figure 1
Effect. Figure 2(a)2 shows a promising tool: Standardized Marriage Rate Curve (SMRC). As shown
in the Figure, the curve's horizontal axis is productivity level and the vertical axis is Standardized
Marriage Rate (SMR), which is the marriage rate in the productivity group divided by the marriage
rate in total population. For example, if the marriage rate in the first productivity group is 0.7, and
the marriage rate of total population is 0.35, the Standardized Marriage Rate of the first productivity
group is 2. As in this example, the Standardized Marriage Rate could exceed 1, and this means the
marriage rate in that group exceeds the marriage rate in the total population. The reason why we
standardize marriage rate can be illustrated in Figure 2(b). In this figure, line a and b are two non-
standardized marriage rate curves observed in two populations with total marriage rate 0.4 and 0.6.
The flat patterns of the marriage rate curves are evidence that both the populations are not under
the Effect. A good tool to represent the effect should give these two populations the same curve,
just as line c, the completely overlapping marriage rate curves after we standardize the marriage
rate in both populations. The advantage to use SMRC to represent the Effect is obvious. First, for
given ND and OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total population, the corresponding SMRC is
always the same. Second, for a given ND and different OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total
population, the corresponding SMRC will always be different. Third, For different ND and a given
OD, no matter what marriage rate is in total population, the corresponding SMRC will always be
different. Forth, if one or more than one groups are with SMRs greater than 1, here must be at least
2Figure 2 is made up for the convenience of illustration and is not based on any existing data.
5
Figure 2
one group with SMR less than 1. The first three properties ensure any Effect can be unambiguously
defined by an SMRC and because of the forth one, we can conveniently only focus on the groups
with SMRs greater than 1 to measure the level of the Effect.
Once we agree on using SMRC to represent the Effect, we can start finding the measurement of
the level of the Effect and then use the Statement mentioned in previous paragraph to test marriage
selection hypothesis. The level of the Effect should be evaluated from two respects: first, in what
productivity groups of the SMRC have SMRs greater than 1, and second, how much these SMRs
are different from 1. For example, in Figure 2(b) line c, no group's SMR differs from 1 and thus
no Selection or Specialization Effect exists in this situation. In Figure 2(c), the third and fourth
groups of each line have SMRs greater than 1 and the first and second groups have SMRs less tha
1. Also, in Figure 2(c) line c, the differences betweem SMR and 1 are greater than those in Figure
2(c) line b, thus the level of the Effect in line c is greater than that in line b. However, difficulties
to compare the levels of the Effects still exist, if consider the following situation. In Figure 2(d),
the line d has an SMRC with a higher far right end (the fourth group value), and the line b has an
SMRC with a higher third group height and a lower far right end. It is hard for us to compare the
levels of the Effects in these two lines. Thus, for simplicity reason, we only divide our population
into two groups and the difficulty described above can be avoided. The drawback of this method is
the cutoff value to divide our population is arbitrary, and how this arbitrarily selected cutoff value
will affect our testing result is hard to predict. So, to avoid disturbance caused by this arbitrary
cutoff value, we use five different cutoff values ranging in an interval centered with the mean value
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of the productivity in population.
Now we can start introducing the method more specifically. We can divide our data by states
and years, and these divisions naturally create several experiment groups for our tests. Then we
continue to divide our experiment groups into high productivity group and low productivity group,
by using a cutoff value of productivity. For conciseness, we use the name Hypothesis I to call the
hypothesis that both the marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis are not true.
To test the Hypothesis I, we could test whether the population is under the influence of Marriage
Selection or Labor Specialization Effect (the Effect). The evidence of the existence of such Effect is
that, the SMR is greater than 1 in the higher productivity group. If we find no such evidence, we
do not reject Hypothesis I and we conclude that neither the marriage selection hypothesis nor the
specialization hypothesis explains the marriage premium. If find such evidence, then we reject the
Hypothesis I and continue testing which hypothesis explains the marriage premium. This is the step
one of our tests. The data shows a greater than 1 SMR in high productivity group and this means
Hypothesis I should be rejected. Then we continue testing which hypothesis explains the marriage
premium by finding the source of the Effect. Noticing that if marriage selection does explain the
marriage premium, the level of marriage market competition is positively related to the level of the
Effect. This means the difference between SMR and 1 will be greater in the experiment groups
with higher level of marriage market competition. If we do not observe such relationship, we can
conclude that marriage selection does not explain marriage premium and only labor specialization
explains the premium. If we do observe such relationship, we could conclude the marriage selection
hypothesis explains the marriage premium.
However, two measurement problems still exist in this method, even after we successfully measure
the level of Selection or Specialization Effect. First, how can we measure the productivity as a
comparable variable over time and space (states)? Second, how can we measure the marriage market
competition level? These two problems will be discussed in the following Section.
2.2 Measurement of Productivity
Productivity cannot be directly observed in most situations. We have to find indicators to represent
different levels of productivity. However, the choice of indicators should be prudent. For example, if
we measure productivity with a set of personal characteristics such as education level and experience,
how we compare the productivity of two males becomes a problem. We can hardly tell which one
is more productivity among a male with 10 years' education and 7 years' working experience and a
male with 7 years' education and 10 years' working experience.
In competitive markets, one's wage rate should always be equal to marginal productivity. Thus,
the wage rate seems to be a promising measurement of productivity. However, new problem occurs
when using wage rate, the price of labor, to measure the productivity. We need our measurement
can be compared across time and space, a property that the nominal price does not possess. To
compare the price level over time, the standard method is the CPI adjustment and CPI is officially
reported every year by Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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To compare the price over space, we can use a similar method to adjust price level into comparable
variable in each state. Lots of studies have been conducted to find such an adjustment method. In
a joint project conducted by Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), Aten (2005, 2006) for the first time estimates such a method called regional price parities
(RPPs) in for 38 large metropolitan and non-metropolitan, but urban, areas of the United States
for 2003 and 2004. Aten (2007) extends his estimation into remaining areas using a multistage
approach.
In our article, we first use CPI adjustment to convert wage rate in each year to 2004, the year
Aten's estimation is based on. Then using the estimation results from Aten (2007), we convert
the time comparable wage rate into time-space comparable wage rate. Once the wage rate can be
compared over time and space, the same wage rate in different states and years now can represent
the same productivity level.
2.3 Describe Marriage Market Competition
2.3.1 Availability Ratio
To properly describe marriage market competition in an area, two sets of indicators can be used.
The first is Sex Ratio (SR); the second is Availability Ratio (AR), according to the research of
Goldman, Westoff and Hammerslough (1984). Availability Ratio estimates the availability of a
person's potential mates in the population, which is built under the concept that a perfectly matched
marriage market should contain not only the same number of males and females but also proper
structure of males and females. A young man aged 22 has very little chance to get married to a
woman aged 60 even though the marriage market is very competitive for male. The AR takes these
marriage pattern into consideration. Specifically, for a male (say A) in the population, his AR is
computed as following:
Availability Ratio =
Number of suitable women for A
Average Number of Suitable Men for A's Suitable women
In a perfectly matched marriage market, everyone's AR is unity. A greater than one AR means the
marriage competition faced by a person is low; a less than one AR means the competition is high.
The reason why use two sets of indicators is because the marriage market is not a well-behaved
market that is ruled by classical economics market laws. The marriage market, or the marriage pool,
more precisely, is not completely ruled by law of supply and demand. Many studies, such as Schwartz
(2005), Qian (1999), have found assortative pattern in marriage. This pattern implies interracial,
inter-educational marriages rarely happen. This pattern not only exists in the USA, but also exists
in other countries, such as Canada (Hou and Myles, 2011). However, Qian and Lichter (2011),
Tucker and Kernan (1990) show this pattern does gradually shift over time. Thus, it is natural to
question, whether the marriage pattern shifts in under different marriage market circumstance. For
example, suppose a marriage pattern exists in a certain area. The pattern indicates a group of
people are more likely to get married with another group of people. The marriage that does not fit
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the pattern is rare. Specifically speaking, suppose the marriage pattern shows that, high educated
young women is more likely to marry to high educated young men, but will this pattern change
when a war happens and the number of young men in population decrease dramatically? Will there
be more marriages between high educated young women and low educated elder men? If it will, the
marriage market shows well behaved economics characteristics, and then the Sex Ratio3, other than
Availability Ratio, is a better indicator of marriage market competition; if it will not, the marriage
pool is stubborn on its own pattern, and the Availability Ratio is the better indicator. Also, the
fact that the correlation coefficient of Availability Ratio and Sex Ratio is only -0.019, means these
two indicators are not linearly interchangeable and at least one of them is not a good indicator for
marriage market competition.
More research is needed to confirm whether the marriage pattern is stubborn or not. To conduct
such researches, data containing first marriage information is needed. Due to the data unavailability,
a formal confirmation of such stubbornness will not be included in this article. Two variables are
both used as indicators of marriage competition to cover the entire situation in reality.
To compute Available Ratio for a person, we should first define the word suitable. In the
population, only a certain group of people who satisfy a set of constraints will be considered as
suitable for a particular person with particular characteristics. For example, for a 45 years old
single man with PhD degree, a single woman aged 40 with master's degree is considered as suitable,
while a 16 years old single woman with high school diploma and a married woman aged 70 with
master's degree are both considered as not suitable. The constraints discussed in this article are
age, race, geographic location, education, marital status, and eligibility. The criterion for setting a
constraint is simple. The set constraint should cover at least 90% (or 85%, in some situations) of
observed existing marriage after excluding the least possible marriage combinations. For example,
100 forty-year-old men get married this year, their wives are aged from 20-50. Only 5 of them
married women less than 22 and 5 of them married women over 46. Excluding these two marriage
combinations will make our constraint cover 90% of the observed marriages last year, and exclude
any more other marriage combinations will make the coverage less than 90%. So the age constraint
for a forty-year-old man is 22 to 46.
2.3.2 Education Constraint
Due to the data availability, in this article we can only fully discuss the constraint on education.
Other constraints are detailed discussed by Goldman, Westoff and Hammerslough (1984).
Table 1 shows the number of marriages observed for each education combination. Education levels
are sorted into 8 groups as 1-under middle school, "2-middle school or high school un-graduated or
GED", "3-high school diploma", "4-collage un-graduated", "5-bachelor", "6-master", "7-doctoral,
"8-professional education".
3 Number of males over Number of females in this article
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Table 1
Table 2
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Table 3
Table 4
Table 2 shows relative frequency of man's education level for woman's education group. This table
can be used to help setting the education constraint on women. According to the criterion introduced
above, the constraints are shown in Table 3 and Table 4, using different coverage percentage level.
In the tables, the marriage combinations that are regarded as suitable under the constraint are
marked with 1 (green slots) and the unsuitable combinations are marked with 0 (yellow slots).
Similarly, Table 5 and Table 6 show the men's constraints under different coverage percentage level.
These tables map out the entire suitable mate set for people of each education level. For example,
using 85% coverage level, from Table 4, a man with education level 4 is suitable for women with
education level 2, 3, 4 and 5; from table 6, a womnn with education level 6 is suitable for men with
education 5, 6, 7 and 8.
This diagonal shape result is highly consistent with the result of Goldman, Westoff and Hammer-
slough (1984). They use another set of criteria to derive the constraint matrix, which is also diagonal.
In their research, they preset several rules to capture the education constraint and then check the
coverage of observed marriage under each rule and then decide the best rule for constructing the
11
Table 5
Table 6
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constraint.
2.3.3 Other Constraints
Age, marital status, and eligibility are also constraints which should be considered when defining
suitable mates.
Marital Status
In this article, divorced, widowed and all other marital statuses other than married, spouse present
are regarded as single. And only single people are in the marriage market. This simplification may
bring constraints missing problem. Widowed or divorced person may be more likely to remarry to
a person with a similar marital status than to married to a single, never married person. Without
further discussion about the risk of this simplification, the possibility to overestimate Availability
Ratio cannot be eliminated. Also, couples bounded by a non-official marriage form, such as cohab-
itant which has theoretically same effect as marriage, should be excluded from marriage pool. But
these couples will report themselves as single in the data. This missing information will again cause
over estimation in AR.
As the non-availability of detailed marriage data, this article will use Goldman's results about
age and eligibility. The following part is a brief summary of that research.
Age
Age constraints for male and female are displayed in the Figure 3. As shown in the figure, both
lower bound and higher bound of male's constraint are lower than those of female's. Also, people
younger than 16 and older than 75 are considered as too young or too old and are excluded from
marriage market.
Eligibility
Unmarried homosexuals, confirmed bachelors, and all others with characteristics that would make
them ineligible to get into marriage market should be excluded. Census data of 1980 shows first
marriage rarely occurs after age 45. People elder than 45 and single without having any previous
marriage are highly unlikely to get married in the later ages. So these people are excluded from
marriage market.
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2.4 The Summary of Testing Procedure
After solving the two measurement problems, we can now state our testing method in a step by step
procedure.
Step 1, Divide the data-set into different experiment groups by years and states and compute
necessary variables in each experiment group: Availability Ratio (AR) and Average Availability
Ratio, Sex Ratio, Time-Space Comparable Income Wage, and SMRs. Then divide each experiment
group into high productivity group and low productivity group by a Time-Space Comparable Log
Income Wage Cutoff Value.
Step 2, Testing the Hypothesis I: Both marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis
are not true. If in the high productivity group the SMR is greater than 1, we reject Hypothesis I
and continue to Step 3. If it is not, we do not reject Hypothesis I and our conclusion will be both
marriage selection hypothesis and specialization hypothesis do not explain the marriage premium.
Step 3, Testing the Hypothesis II: The marriage selection hypothesis does not explain the mar-
riage premium but the labor specialization hypothesis does explain the marriage premium. If in high
productivity group the difference between SMR and 1 has no correlation with AR or SR, which are
measurements of marriage market competition, we do not reject Hypothesis II. We conclude that,
the marriage selection hypothesis does not explain the marriage premium but the labor specializa-
tion hypothesis does explain the marriage premium in this situation. If the difference has positive
relationship with AR or SR, we reject the Hypothesis II and we need have more discussion about
testing the correctness of labor specialization hypothesis before we draw a final conclusion.
3 Data
To conduct the analysis, I use the 2005-2012 ACS Data. The full dataset has 24,160,907 observations.
Due to the computation power limitation, containing too many observations will make it hard to
compute Availability Ratio, and thus a 20% subsample is randomly drawn from the full dataset. In
this subsample, 4,836,024 observations are drawn. These observations are divided into 408 groups
by year and states (51 states and 8 years). According to our research purpose, people whose races
are not white, and working places are outside US or in Puerto Rico, are omitted from the sample.
Also, individuals with missing values on important variables such as wage, work place, education
level are omitted. After omitting observations that are out of our interest, or with missing variables
values, we have 1,728,682 observations remaining.
AR is computed for every unmarried eligible person in dataset. For each year of each state, an
average AR is computed to indicate the marriage market competition level in that area that year.
Listing these results will be not interesting because the data contains information in 8 years and 51
states (no information on Alaska), which means 408 groups exist and each group has its own results.
As mentioned above, we omit observations with missing value on important variables. However,
omitting and selecting will cause information lost or even structural change in data. Thus, variables
should be calculated before we delete any observations. In our research, 4 variables are computed
14
from original data: Sex Ratio in each state, time-space comparable wage rate, Availability Ratio for
each unmarried eligible person, SMRs. The first two variables are calculated before any omitting and
selecting. However, to successfully compute Availability Ratio, we need information about people's
age, race, and education level. People with these missing values on these variables are impossible
for us to compute Availability Ratio, thus it is computed in the selected sample. But this should
not be a major problem in this research because only 3.45% people are with missing information in
age, race or education. The problem is more noticeable when we compute the SMRs, which requires
income or wage information. 20.07% observations in our sample have no information on wage or
income. Some structural changes occur after we delete those observations and the impact should be
noted here.
The original data is composed of 48.57% males and 51.43% females; in the data after omitting,
these numbers become 51.91% and 48.09%. The change is significant. But luckily, this sex structural
change will only affect the Sex Ratio computation in our research, and the Sex Ratio is computed
before we omitting any observations. Also, among those who are with no wage information, 72.96%
are under middle school education, thus we can expect a relatively low wage rate among these people.
And 99.95% of them are single. Considering these two facts, omitting those observations from our
sample will cause an upward SMR bias in low productivity group and downward bias in the high
productivity group because those observations are all unmarried people with low education level.
These biases may affect our test results in Step 2. One simple way to fix this problem is to assume
those observations with less than middle school are all with low income (thus will be grouped into
low productivity group), because they are all single and low educated. One risk to use this method
is we may over adjust the data because we are not 100% sure that those people will all be sorted
into low productivity group. In particular, this risk will become higher when our cutoff value is at
the lower or upper bound of its range. At the lower bound, we may sort too many observations
into low productivity group and at the upper bound we may sort too many observations into high
productivity group.
4 Result
In Step 1, Availability Ratio, Sex Ratio, and SMR are computed in every 408 groups by year and
states. Listing this result here will be not interesting. Descriptive statistics result is as following.
As mentioned in Section 2, we use the difference between SMR and 1 to measure the Effect of
Marriage Selection or Labor Specialization, thus we use Variable SMR-1 to conduct our tests. Using
these results, we can conduct the test in Step 2. Our null hypothesis is the mean of SMR-1 in high
productivity group is 0. The t-statistics and p-values for the tests under each log wage cutoff value
are shown below.
As shown in the table, in all settings of cutoff values, the mean of SMR-1 is significantly greater
than zero and thus we need to have more discussion about which hypothesis is true, between marriage
selection hypothesis and Labor specialization hypothesis. This requires us to find the relationship
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between SMR-1 and SR or Average AR. To find the true relationship between these variables,
correlation coefficients are calculated not only between SMR-1 and SR or Average AR but also
between the other forms of SMR-1 (square and square root) and other forms of SR or Average AR
(square and square root). Before we actually calculate the correlation coefficients, outliers should
be omitted. Figure 4 and Table 9 show the descriptive statistics of SMR-1 and how outliers are
omitted.
After omitting the outliers, the correlation coefficient matrix is listed in Table 10. In the matrix,
correlation coefficients greater than 0.10 are marked with asterisks. The corresponding variables
behind these coefficients may have strong correlation. To have clearer results, regressions have been
pairwise conducted between all variables. The estimated slope coefficients are shown in Table 11.
The regression coefficients which are significant at 5% significance level have been marked with
asterisks.
The regression results are different under different cutoff values. Positive correlations exist be-
tween SR (and its other forms) and SMR-1 (and its other forms) at 2.5 and 3.0 cutoff values. Under
cutoff values of 1.5, 2.0 and 3.5, no strong correlation is found. As mentioned in Section 3, the over
adjusting risk will be higher when cutoff value is at its lower and upper bound and thus the results
under 2.5 and 3.0 cutoff values are more reliable than results under other cutoff values, which means
SR have positive correlation with SMR-1.
However, the results also show that AR has no strong correlation with SMR-1, and this makes
the situation complicated. As mentioned in Section 2, because we do not know whether AR or SR
is the better indicator of marriage market competition, we need to carefully interpret our result. If
SR is the proper indicator of marriage market competition, our result shows a positive correlation
between marriage market competition and the level of the Effect, which means the source of the
Effect is marriage selection. Marriage Selection hypothesis explains the male marriage premium.
However, if AR, not SR, is the proper indicator of marriage market competition and SR is irrelevant
with marriage competition, more discussion is needed to draw a final conclusion.
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Figure 3
As mentioned in section 2, the Effect can only be the result of three sources: marriage selection,
human capital accumulation from labor specialization, and discrimination. If AR is the good indica-
tor of marriage competition, which implies SR is not a good indicator, the Effect can not be resulted
from marriage selection because no relationship between the level of the effect and the marriage
competition is found. Also, under the classical economics assumptions, discrimination is also not
a promising source of the Effect because employers are supposed to be rational and discriminating
on employee's marital status will not maximize their profits. The only possible source of the Effect
is Labor Specialization. However, the positive relationship between SR and the level of the Effect
must be explained before we accept this statement. If we accept this statement, the human cap-
ital accumulation caused by labor specialization after marriage is positively correlated with SR, a
variable that is not an indicator of marriage competition.
This wired correlation between the human capital accumulation and SR makes the statement not
convincing. According to the labor specialization hypothesis, the human capital accumulation is the
result of labor specialization between husbands and wives. Thus the positive correlation between
the human capital accumulation and Sex Ratio should be explained by the correlation between the
degree of specialization and Sex Ratio. According to the Beckers' Theory of the Family, husband
and wives specialize in different kinds of works because their opportunity costs will be minimized if
do so. How the Sex Ratio, which is not an indicator of marriage market competition, will affect the
opportunity cost of human capital investment is very hard to imagine.
As argued above, the positive correlation we observed between SR and the level of the Effect is
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wired if SR is not a good indicator of marriage market competition, and thus we tend to believe
SR is a good indicator of marriage market competition. Honestly speaking, this belief we hold is
not rigorously proved and due to the data availability constraint, we can not have a whole section
to argue for this belief. However, if we accept this belief, the marriage selection hypothesis does
explain the marriage premium.
5 Conclusion
After solving some measurement problems, including finding the measurement of productivity
(the Time-Space Comparable Wage), finding the indicator of marriage market competition (Avail-
ability Ratio and Sex Ratio), defining and finding the measurement of Marriage Selection or Labor
Specialization Effect (the difference between Standardized Marriage Rate and 1), we find a positive
correlation between marriage market competition (SR) and the level of the Effect (SMR-1). The
result is an evidence of the correctness of marriage selection hypothesis.
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